Dinamika Kerja Sama Internasional Dalam Menghadapi Krisis Iklim Global: Antara Kepentingan Nasional, Keadilan Lingkungan, Dan Efektivitas Tata Kelola Multilateral
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.68778/josph.v2i3.40Keywords:
International Cooperation; Climate Crisis; National Interests; Environmental Justice; Multilateral Governance.Abstract
The global climate crisis has become a strategic issue in International Relations, revealing tensions between national interests, collective responsibilities, and structural inequalities in international environmental governance. Although multilateral cooperation mechanisms have been established through the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Paris Agreement, their effectiveness remains constrained by divergent development priorities, unequal climate finance, and asymmetrical mitigation responsibilities. This study examines the dynamics of international cooperation in addressing the global climate crisis by focusing on the relationship between national interests, environmental justice, and the effectiveness of multilateral governance. Employing a qualitative approach through literature review and documentary analysis, the research adopts Neoliberal Institutionalism as its primary theoretical framework, complemented by global environmental governance and climate justice perspectives. The analysis suggests that multilateral institutions strengthen coordination, transparency, and the legitimacy of international cooperation, while their substantive effectiveness remains limited by power asymmetries, capacity disparities, and implementation gaps. This article proposes a justice-oriented climate governance framework in which the alignment of national interests, distributive justice, and institutional accountability constitute essential conditions for effective multilateral cooperation.
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