Kartelisasi Partai Politik, Pelemahan Oposisi, Dan Krisis Representasi Rakyat: Analisis Ekonomi Politik Populisme Programatik Dan Kemunduran Demokrasi Di Indonesia

Abstract

Indonesia's post-Reformasi democratic development reveals a paradox between the persistence of electoral mechanisms and the weakening of substantive political representation. Political party cartelization, reflected in the formation of broad and accommodative governing coalitions, risks blurring the distinction between government and opposition. This study examines the relationship between party cartelization, weakened opposition, the crisis of popular representation, and programmatic populism in Indonesian democracy. Employing a qualitative descriptive-analytical approach, the research draws on literature-based analysis and a political economy perspective. Its theoretical framework integrates Katz and Mair's cartel party thesis, Pitkin's theory of political representation, and Mudde and Kaltwasser's conceptualization of populism. The analysis suggests that political parties' pursuit of state resources and governmental access can encourage elite convergence, restrict policy competition, and weaken political accountability. Under these circumstances, programmatic populism may serve as a source of electoral legitimacy through welfare distribution without necessarily strengthening substantive representation. The study concludes that the central challenge facing Indonesian democracy is not merely the existence of broad coalitions, but the weakness of oversight mechanisms, party autonomy, and meaningful connections between elected representatives and their constituents.